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RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
Joshua L. Dratelt
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1. WOULD PRESIDENT OBAMA HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A
U.S. CITIZEN WITHOUT CHARGE IN A MILITARY BRIG FOR SIX MONTHS
IF THAT CITIZEN-WHO LIVES IN MINNESOTA-IS SUSPECTED OF LINKS
TO AL QAEDA FOLLOWING A ONE-MONTH TRIP TO SOMALIA?
The question brings to mind the oft-quoted (but perhaps never
uttered) remark attributed to President Andrew Jackson after the
Supreme Court, in Worcester v. State of Georgia, invalidated a Georgia
state statute extending state sovereignty to Cherokee tribal lands:
'John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce 
it. '2
Certainly the President, as we have witnessed in the context of the
t Criminal defense attorney, New York City, B.A., 1978, magna cum laude
Columbia College,J.D., 1981, Harvard Law School.
1. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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detention of, among othersJose Padilla from 2002 to 2006, possesses
the physical authority to detain a U.S. citizen under the circumstances
described above-and that may be all that is necessary for practical
purposes.
By the time the Supreme Court addresses the issue dispositively,
the President will have accomplished the objective: the citizen's
veritable, indefinite detention without access to any form of indepen-
dentjudicial adjudication of the merits of the detention. Indeed, in
Padilla, a District Court in the Southern District of New York, and the
Second Circuit thereafter, ordered that Mr. Padilla be provided access
to counsel.3 Those rulings were ignored until, on the eve of the
Supreme Court argument nearly a year later, the Government
permitted access to counsel by its grace, and not in compliance with
judicial directive.
Similarly, neither the Second Circuit's decision declaring invalid
Mr. Padilla's indefinite detention without the right to habeas corpus,
and directing that he be afforded an evidentiary hearing,4 nor the
District of South Carolina's subsequent decision finding Mr. Padilla'sS 5
detention unconstitutional, were honored by the executive. Only
when the inevitable head-counting relative to the anticipated vote in
the Supreme Court indicated the Court, too, would rule in Mr.
Padilla's favor, did the President unilaterally abandon the "enemy
combatant" detention of Mr. Padilla, and opt instead for a criminal
indictment.
6
The case of Saleh al-Marri followed a nearly identical pattern.
Although not a citizen, Mr. al-Marri was subject to the converse of Mr.
Padilla's situation: he was initially charged in federal court, then
removed and declared an "enemy combatant" and held in military
custody, only to be returned to federal court once the Supreme Court
agreed to hear his appeal . Nor did a favorable intermediate decision
by a Fourth Circuit panel disturb for even a moment Mr. al-Marri's
3. Padillav. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695,699 (2d Cir. 2003); Padilla ex. rel. Newman
v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
4. Padia, 352 F.3d at 724.
5. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678,688 (D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386
(4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); see also Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S.
1062, 1062 (2006) (mem.) (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Stevens, J.,
concurring).
6. See United States v. Padilla, No. 04-CR-60001, 2006 WL 2415946 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 18, 2006).
7. A-Marriv. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), rev'd, al-Marriv. Pucciarelli,
534 F.3d. 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 680 (2008), dismissed as
moot, al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S.Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.).
5008 [Vol. 36:5
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indefinite detention without charge or process.
Thus, the President's power to act and the judiciary's general
inability to enforce its orders-or even resolve the issue when the
executive moots it by changing the detainee's designation from
"enemy combatant" to criminal defendant-will always trump
whatever constitutional principles apply. Before moving on to a more
detailed discussion of the practical implications of that authority, for
the record I will state my opinion that such detention is unconstitu-
tional. The reasons for such a conclusion are sufficiently set forth in
the opinions already cited, as well as injustice Scalia's dissent from
8
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
The thornier issue for me is this: what is to stop the President
from exercising that detention power in the first place? Knowing that
the principal goal-indefinite detention-will be achieved simply by
defiance as the case grinds its way through the lower and appellate
courts, what incentive is there for the executive to act lawfully and
consistently with constitutional rules?
For me, the issue presents a genuine dilemma that I have notyet
resolved, although I careen back and forth without making much
progress toward the ultimate decision. Leaving aside the constitu-
tional question, should we consign these special cases and their
extremely rare occurrence to "outlier" status, like lightning strikes,
and leave the system otherwise undisturbed? Or should we construct
a new set of procedures to address them, no matter how infrequently
they occur? Would creating a set of rules give the executive pause
before acting, or would that new system encourage the power to be
used more often? Is it moral, or even advisable, to sacrifice the
fundamental rights of a select few in order to avoid the potential
diminution of rights for others?
8. 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia,J.,joined byStevens,J, dissenting) ("Where
the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition
has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime. Where
the exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution's Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9,
cl. 2, allows Congress to relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension,
however, the Executive's assertion of military exigency has not been thought
sufficient to permit detention without charge. No one contends that the congres-
sional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the Government relies to
justify its actions here, is an implementation of the Suspension Clause.").
9. A "dilemma" presents two choices, neither of which is satisfactory. SeeTHE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARYOFTHE ENGLiSH LANGUAGE 554 (2d ed. 1987). In contrast,
a "Hobson's Choice" (often mistaken for a dilemma) presents, in fact, no choice at all
(accepting the mount chosen by Mr. Hobson, the proprietor of the stable, or none at
all). See id at 909.
2010] 5009
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Since the Padilla situation arose, I have wrestled with the ques-
tion, from the perspective of a defense lawyer, whether Mr. Padilla
would have benefitted from a set of rules crafted to govern his
particular circumstances, i.e., one that enumerated the circumstances
under which he could be initially detained, the process to which he
was due before that detention could be sustained, what burden the
Government would be compelled to satisfy before that detention
could continue, and for how long. Or would that merely have
provided a convenient imprimatur for what the Constitution might
well prohibit under any circumstance?
As a citizen generally, and a lawyer specifically, I have wrestled
with a corresponding set of questions: Is it acceptable to have a two-
tiered system ofjustice that eschews rules for a small number? Is that
small number sufficient to justify tinkering with a system that has
operated satisfactorily for more than 200 years? Or do we want to
leave the executive the discretion to use such extraordinary and
perhaps ultra vires powers sparingly, with wisdom and restraint, rather
than inviting a broader, permanent, and more politicized approach to
the problem?
It is hard to argue that Mr. Padilla secured any advantage from
the lack of any rules. His uncharged detention lasted far longer than
the six months proposed in the question above. It lasted four years.
Also, he was deprived of contact with his lawyers for nearly two years
(and even then only under strict conditions). He suffered solitary
confinement, involuntary, aggressive, and coercive interrogation, and
he was denied any opportunity to challenge the factual basis for his
confinement.
In the course of my continuing internal debate, I have developed
certain immutable principles:
(1) The only gap in our current criminal justice system involves those
persons who present a genuine, imminent, and verifiable threat of
committing some specific, articulable act that will cause either mass
casualties or the failure of some vital infrastructural element that
implicates a serious safety risk and substantial casualties (i.e., an air
traffic control or railway signal system), but for whom the evidence to
arrest is insufficient or unavailable (in the latter instance, for
example, sufficiently reliable information provided by a foreign
10. I have chosen the term "uncharged detention" over "administrative
detention" because the latter is merely a euphemism for the former.
5010 [Vol. 36:5
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government that refuses to share the primary source material with the
United States).
(2) Any type of uncharged detention system could apply only to such
persons. Threats posed as a result of past conduct, or prior conduct
that cannot be prosecuted for whatever reason, or the person's status
in a terrorist organization, would not suffice. Thus, the factual
paradigm in the question would not meet those conditions, although
I have used that limited and generalized fact pattern as a springboard
to discuss the broader issue of what many denominate "preventive
detention.""
(3) A set of rules would be optimal, rather than permitting the
executive to act ad hoc. Indeed, I believe that any President confront-
ing the situation set forth in item (1) above would act regardless
whether any legal mechanism for such detention existed. As a result,
if the President is committed to acting notwithstanding the absence of
rules, or in contravention of existing law or constitutional provisions
(as the past has confirmed, whether it be President Bush with Mr.
Padilla, or prior Presidents, such as Lincoln and Roosevelt), I would
prefer rules that at the very least provide my client access to a lawyer
and the courts and a realistic means of challenging his initial
detention or its indefinite continuation.
(4) Any such set of rules should be created within and integrated in
the already existing criminal justice system. A new, separate "national
security court" would inherently possess too many defects, present
and potential, policy and pragmatic, that it would be a prescription
for unfairness and injustice for those charged, and would represent a
fundamental and unwise departure from the public, transparent, and
therefore reliable system of criminal justice that enables the public to
regard it with confidence and pride'
2
11. The term is used with much imprecision. For example, while many describe
the United Kingdom's system as "preventive detention," British law enforcement
officials have correctly protested that it is more accurately termed "pre-charge
detention," as it lasts only for prescribed periods, is designed to permit law
enforcement to collect evidence sufficient to institute criminal charges, and cannot
be continued indefinitely. See CLARE FEIKERT, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONG., PRE-CHARGE
DETENTION FOR TERRORIST SUSPECrS: UNrED KINGDOM (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.php.
12. The basis for my opposition to any "national security court" and the
numerous intractable flaws I foresee in such a system are too lengthy to include here
and include objectives both procedural and substantive, policy and pragmatic, legal
2010] 5011
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Applying these principles, I have considered what components
would be essential to a rational system of such uncharged detention
that balanced the various considerations-including security,
intelligence, and a detainee's rights-so that none eclipsed the other.
However, I do not vouch for its ultimate constitutionality, but merely
for its attempt to harmonize the practical with the statutory, and
security with fairness.5  In that spirit, those elements-a non-
exhaustive list at this stage-are as follows:
(a) As noted above, such a detention regime would apply only to
those persons who present a genuine, imminent, and verifiable threat
of committing some specific, articulable act that will cause either mass
casualties or the failure of some system vital infrastructural element
that implicates a serious safety risk and substantial casualties (i.e., an
air traffic control or railway signal system), but for whom the evidence
to arrest is insufficient or unavailable. I am willing to be somewhat
flexible in defining "unavailable." For example, in addition to the
situation described in item (1) above, "unavailability" could conceiva-
bly involve a human intelligence source who would be in danger if the
information were made public through a criminal charge, or whose
continued undercover value so outweighed the disclosure as to make
the latter a threat to national security. Nevertheless, such determina-
tions would not be made solely by intelligence or military officials, or
and political. I see "national security courts" as a solution in search of a problem
because no one has yet articulated the failings of Article III courts to the extent that
would require such a dramatic deviation from what we have utilized successfully for
more than 200 years. Ultimately, I believe "national security courts" would not
enhance U.S. national security, but diminish it.
13. Certainly due process does not proscribe all forms of uncharged detention.
State mental hygiene laws permit involuntary commitment without charge. See, e.g.,
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.27 (McKinney 2006). Federal immigration law allows
seven days of detention without any administrative recourse. See 8 U.S.C. §
1226a(a) (5) (2006). The Supreme Court has authorized continued detention of
certain sex offenders even after expiration of their prison terms. See, e.g., Seling v.
Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001); Hendricks v. Kansas, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997). And
the Court has also approved the denial of bail pursuant to the federal Bail Reform Act
of 1984, which for the first time expressly authorized detention without any bail
(albeit for those already charged with a criminal offense) based solely on the
defendant's continued "danger to the community" if released. See United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Surely these are all examples of "preventive
detention" in practice if not in name. For purposes of this discussion, I leave aside
detention pursuant to the Laws ofArmed Conflict, as presumptively those would not
apply to a person apprehended in the U.S. in connection with the prospective
commission of a criminal act.
5012 [Vol. 36:5
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even ordinary law enforcement or prosecutorial personnel, but would
have to be certified by the Attorney General, and presented to a
federal judge ex parte for approval. However, if the subject was
already under indictment, the avenue of uncharged detention would
not be available to the government (thereby preventing repetition of
the al-Marri shell game).
(b) As an additional means of ensuring that (a) is not too permeable
a standard, the potential offense would have to be a specifically
enumerated crime, carefully limited to only those that criminalize the
use of weapons of mass destruction, or radiological, biological, or
nuclear weapons, or which target the type of systems described in (1).
Congress could not expand the list of qualifying offenses except to
add offenses not already enacted by the effective date of the new
system, and then only by a four-fifths majority vote of all legislators
(House and Senate), notjust those members present for a vote.
(c) The detainee would have the right to counsel from the outset,
and if the detainee could not afford counsel, a lawyer would be
appointed and paid by the court pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act
15
(that covers indigent defendants).
(d) The Bill of Rights and any relevant criminal rules and statutes
would apply to any such detention and the detainee. In particular,
the detainee would have the right to remain silent, to counsel prior to
(and at any) interrogation, to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, and to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. At
certain stages, as set forth below, the right to confront accusers and
call witnesses, and to present affirmative evidence, and for the
detainee to testify, would apply.
(e) The detainee would be entitled to discovery. Defense counsel
with appropriate security clearance would have access to classified
materials pursuant to the provisions of the Classified Information
Procedures Act, 16 which would govern any classified aspects of the
proceedings.
14. It has long been the case that the identity of an undercover officer can be
withheld from the defense in an ordinary criminal prosecution if such identifying
information is not exculpatory. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006).
16. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006).
2010] 5013
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(f) The determination to detain, both initial and subsequent, would
be subject to challenge pursuant to the following time frames and
escalating burdens imposed upon the Government:
(i) the detainee would have to be produced in court before a
judge within the time prescribed by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure ("without unnecessary delay") .l At that proceed-
ing, the Government would have to establish probable cause to
detain. Ajudge could conduct an evidentiary hearing, but would not
be required to do so. The evidence would not have to be competent,
i.e., it could consist of hearsay, and the court could rely on ex parte
submissions;' s
(ii) after fifteen days, continued detention would require the
Government to meet an increased burden of proof: preponderance of
the evidence. Again, the question whether to conduct an evidentiary
hearing would be within the judge's discretion;
(iii) after sixty days, the burden of proof would rise to clear and
convincing evidence. At that point, an evidentiary hearing, with the
right to call and cross-examine witnesses, would be mandatory. The
detainee would have the right, but not the obligation, to testify. Such
testimony would be immunized pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 to 6005
(providing for "use" immunity), and would enjoy all the attendant' 9
protections. The court would not be permitted to rely on ex parte
submissions (and if the court initially was provided expartematerial by
the Government, that material would have to be disclosed to cleared
defense counsel); and
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.
18. That would not represent a departure from current standards, as under
federal law an indictment need not be based on competent evidence. Indeed,
current federal grand jury practice often involves a single law enforcement agent
relating to a grand jury the contents of the case file, including multiple hearsay,
which, if it meets the probable cause threshold, would be sufficient to secure an
indictment. In contrast, certain states, such as New York, limit a grand jury
presentation to competent evidence. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 190.65(1)
(McKinney 2007).
19. See also Simmons v, United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) ("[Wlhen a
defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on
the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.").
[Vol. 36:55014
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(iv) after 120 days, in order to justify continued detention
without charge, the Government would have to establish its case
beyond a reasonable doubt after an evidentiary hearing subject to the
same rules as in item (iii). Hearsay would still be permitted, but only
to the extent the evidence conforms with standards governing Rule
807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests ofjustice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence would apply in all other respects, and
the court's determination would have to be reflected in a written
opinion.
(g) If the Government prevailed, the detainee would have a right to
appeal (and a continuing right to appointed counsel to pursue that
appeal). The court of appeals would be required to perform de novo
review of the district court's legal and factual findings.
(h) The decision to detain would have to be reviewed again by the
district court 180 days thereafter, and again be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The determination whether continued detention
remains justified would have to be based on present dangerousness,
and not on the level of dangerousness at the time of the initial
detention. All of the previous procedural safeguards, including the
appellate rights set forth in (f), would apply to this subsequent 180-
day review.
(i) If the Government prevailed in that 180-day review proceeding, it
would be entitled to detain for another 180 days, at which point it
would be required either to charge the detainee with a criminal
offense or to release him.20 At that point, after more than a year of
uncharged detention, it is more than reasonable to require the
Government either to develop competent evidence sufficient to indict
or reveal what competent evidence was too sensitive to disclose at the
20. The United States could also exercise its immigration authority on aliens and
deport them after the allowable periods of uncharged detention expired.
2010] 5015
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time of the initial detention." Also, a finite time limit on the
maximum uncharged detention, which, at more than a year, certainly
would not be brief by any definition, is necessary to provide adequate
disincentive to the executive to choose that route rather than criminal
charges in the first instance.
(j) Any time periods during which the detainee was in custody (prior
to uncharged detention) as a result of a material witness warrant
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144 would be credited toward the maximum
period of uncharged detention. Conversely, after expiration of the
maximum term applicable to uncharged detention, the detainee
could not be further confined on the basis of a material witness
warrant (either after uncharged detention, or as a result of a material
witness warrant alone). This would prevent achieving the same form
of detention by other means.
(k) A determination in favor of a detainee, i.e., that uncharged
detention was not (or was no longer) warranted, would act as a bar to
any future criminal prosecution for the same conduct at issue in the
uncharged detention proceeding. Again, conversely, this double
jeopardy protection would also apply if uncharged detention were
sought after a criminal prosecution (for the same conduct) was
completed (either by acquittal, conviction, or some other disposition
that activated the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause).
These stringent limitations are purposeful and would be
necessary to discourage the resort to uncharged detention except in
those exceedingly narrow circumstances that genuinely fit the
paradigm. The constraints would ensure that such authority would
not be a default or easy path for the Government, but rather a
difficult, challenging, and cumbersome process utilized only in
unique and authentic emergencies.
I am sure I have forgotten some essentials, but, as noted before,
this list is not exhaustive, although I believe it does cover the funda-
mentals. Also, I recognize it is largely an academic and aspirational
exercise. Given the state of Congress, afflicted as it is by what Dahlia
Lithwick has cleverly labeled "terrorism-derangement syndrome, 22
21. Comparatively, the right to detain without charge under the British system so
often cited by proponents of uncharged detention expires after twenty-eight days.
22. See Dahlia Lithwick, Terrorism Derangement Syndrome, SLATE, Feb. 3, 2010,
http://www.slate.com/id/2243429/. The "syndrome" afflicts notjust Republicans,
5016 [Vol. 36:5
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the likelihood of any system containing a modicum of due process or
other procedural and substantive protections is wholly fanciful.
Consequently, secure in my escapist world of agonizing ambivalence, I
expect never to be compelled to decide whether a particular frame-
work for uncharged detention meets my criteria, because anything
Congress would propose would fall far short.2 3 After all, in the wake
of the Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab arrest,2 4 the cries for complete
abandonment of the criminal justice system and its rights-oriented
approach suggest a far more foreboding solution should Congress
act.25 Also, I am fully cognizant that any form of uncharged detention
is constitutionally unpalatable to many, and that they may be right
(and that I may agree with them if I ever resolve my own internal
debate).
3. DID THE MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ADVISING THAT
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS DID NOT APPLY TO AL QAEDA AND THE
TALIBAN?
4. DID MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY THEIR GUIDANCE TO THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON INTERROGATION STANDARDS?
These two questions can be answered together. 6 The easier,
but also Democrats, Independents, and probably Whigs (and certainly Know-
Nothings).
23. For example, since the draft of this section was prepared, Senators McCain
(R-Ariz.) and Lieberrman (I-Con.) have introduced legislation that would establish a
system of indefinite detention that would bypass a variety of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections, such as the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.
See Statement by Senator McCain on the Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention,
and Prosecution Act of 2010 (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=pressoffice.floorstatements&
contentrecorCid=2af60f3a-05dc-cdf6-7dc9-6501a995cl7c.
24. See Charlie Savage, Nigerian Man Is Indicted in Attempted Plane Attack, N.Y.
TIMEs,Jan. 7, 2010, atA14.
25. See Thomas Catan, Cheney Attacks Obama on National Security, WALL ST.J., Feb.
15, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052 7487045438045 7 5065361936288390.ht
ml; Stephanie Condon, Sarah Palin: Obama's Terrorism Approach "Fatally Flawed,"
CBSNEws, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544-162-6059606-
503544.html.
26. This section was prepared prior to the February 19, 2010, release of the
report by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility entitled
"Investigation Into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation
50172010]
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formalistic legal answer is "no" because legal "malpractice," in
addition to constituting "conduct [that falls] below the ordinary and
reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of
[the] profession [,]" also requires that (1) the attorney be negligent;
(2) such attorney's negligence constitutes the proximate cause of the
loss sustained by the client; and (3) the client "suffered actual and
ascertainable damages.,
27
In this instance, of course, the problem was not "negligence";
indeed, the conduct was conscious and deliberate. Nor are there
"actual and ascertainable damages" customarily recognized by the law.
Moreover, the "proximate cause" is dubious, as any injury-political
or otherwise-was far more likely the result of the policies of the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which were merely ratified by legal
opinion, but were formulated and implemented by others.
The harder question, of course, is whether the OLC's conduct
fell below "the ordinary and reasonable skill and knowledge common-
ly possessed by" a lawyer. In that context, while I cannot seem to
avoid telegraphing my ethno-religious identity by answering a
question with simply another question, here I go again: who is the
"client"? If it is the government agency that employs the lawyer, or
the agency that seeks legal guidance, is it "malpractice" merely to
parrot in a legal opinion precisely what the agency in advance
communicated as the desired conclusion? Thus, when directed by the
client to "write me an opinion that says I can do 'X'," is it malpractice
merely to do as commanded?
However, if the client is the United States as a whole, including its
people who pay the OLC lawyers' salaries, and the Constitution,
which the OLC lawyers have sworn to uphold, the issue becomes more
problematic, not so much when measuring the "ordinary and
reasonable skill and knowledge" of a lawyer facing a particular task,
but more so when defining the ethical obligations of a government
lawyer. Is the principal fidelity to the immediate (agency) boss, to the
ultimate boss (the President), or to the symbolic boss (the people and
the Constitution)?
As a criminal defense lawyer, I am loathe to create new species of
criminal or even civil liability for conduct performed in good faith,
but upon which subsequent events and political or economic
Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists." However, that report has not altered my
ultimate analysis or answer to these two particular questions.
27. I have relied on New York state law for this definition. See, e.g., Walter D.
Peek, Inc. v. Agee, 652 N.Y.S.2d 359, 360 (App. Div. 1997).
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developments cast suspicion. Indeed, one of the problems in today's
litigious world is that failure-whether in the mortgage or securities
industry, or any other business that is responsible for or even simply
identified with serious economic downturn-is never considered an
accident. While some scrutiny and investigation are necessary to
distinguish the purposeful fraud from mere misfortune (or simple
badjudgment), it would be a mistake to begin with the assumption
that all failed enterprises are stained by corrupt intent.
The same is true for the OLC lawyers. I have defended lawyers in
much the same predicament-accused of criminality because of the
results of their advice, without the attendant and necessary criminal
knowledge and intent-and err on the side of caution in this instance
as well. Nevertheless, it would be a salutary development for govern-
ment lawyering in general if a state bar disciplinary committee would
commence an investigation whether a (and by that I mean any)
particular OLC lawyer's conduct conformed with ethical standards.
That would help resolve what is now a contentious issue that has yet to
be answered conclusively, and which to me implicates questions that
are most important because they look forward toward avoiding what
are at best mistakes ofjudgment and at worst unethical behavior, and
not backward merely to punish in the clarity of hindsight. What are
the ethical obligations of a government lawyer-and to whom--when
asked to provide a legal opinion designed to support a political
policy? And how close to constitutional invalidity must that policy
tread before an endorsement of that policy crosses the line from an
aggressive interpretation to a contrived license for illegality?
8. DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES?
While the answer should depend primarily on objective consider-
ations, in fact it does not, which makes the answer "yes." It matters
not whether al Qaeda is in fact capable of dealing a fatal blow to the
United States, or sustaining a series of blows that cumulatively could
prove fatal. Rather, what matters is what is perceived by the majority of
Americans and reflected through the choices made by those who
govern them.
28. Errors of judgment traditionally do not constitute legal malpractice. See
Rosner v. Paley, 481 N.E.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. 1985); Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co.,
P.C., 554 N.Y.S.2d 487,489 (App. Div. 1990) ("[A] n attorneyis not held to the rule of
infallibility and is not liable for an honest mistake ofjudgment, where the proper
course is open to reasonable doubt.").
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In that regard, al Qaeda is treated as an authentic existential
threat,2 regardless of whether its capacity for harm qualifies on an
objective level. For example, the recent controversy over whether the
trial of the persons who will be charged with complicity in the 9/11
attacks would be conducted in New York illustrates the point." Likely
nothing could render New York more of a target for terrorists, and
conducting the trial elsewhere will not reduce New York's status as a
target, if not the number one target. Yet the prospect, however
remote, of an al Qaeda strike at New York as a result of the trial (and
who can state with confidence that if al Qaeda decides to launch some
attack related to the trial, it would not be directed at New York
anyway?) was enough to create panic as if the entire city would
crumble once Khalid Sheikh Mohammed arrived.
Similarly, the criticism of treating Mr. Abdulmutallab as a crimi-
nal defendant, and the corresponding call to jettison the criminal. .. .. 31
justice system entirely in such instances, speaks of a level of fear and
focus appropriate only to the gravest threats. Indeed, the specter of
terrorism, particularly al Qaeda-affiliated terrorism, is the overriding
determinant of any decision even indirectly related. It swallows law
enforcement, intelligence, and security resources at an unprecedent-
ed pace. It has the United States engaged in two difficult military
actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other threats, tangible and immi-
nent, are virtually ignored by the Government, media, and the public,
or treated as hype. Only al Qaeda is incapable of constituting hype.
That is because al Qaeda has captured the imagination-the im-
agination of fear. As random and categorical as the fear of nuclear
annihilation a generation ago, the fear of a catastrophic terrorist
attack has revealed the vulnerability of the American psyche. And as
we have witnessed with respect to financial markets, once the
collective psyche is in retreat, reality is drowned in a tidal wave of
hysteria and distortion.
In that manner al Qaeda qualifies as an existential threat to the
United States because the United States perceives it so, makes
decisions as if it were so, and lives in abject fear--exploited by the
press, politicians, and the new security-technology establish-
29. For purposes of this discussion, I employ a composite definition gleaned
from dictionary.com- "of, relating to, pertaining to, or dealing with existence."
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
30. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in
New York City, N.Y. TIMEsJan. 30,2010, atAl; Gail Collins, Anotherlnconvenient Truth,
N.Y. TIMEsJan. 30, 2010, at A23.
31. See supra notes 23, 25 and accompanying text.
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ment/complex that profits from the economic and popular attention
devoted to the terrorism threat-of it. Again, Dahlia Lithwick's
"terrorism-derangement syndrome" is an apt name for it.32 Americans
are so terrified of al Qaeda that they appear to be convinced that the
country is not sufficiently strong or resilient to survive another
terrorist incident, whether catastrophic or not. Thus, no principle is
too important to sacrifice for just a little more artificial security from
al Qaeda.
The analysis above is not intended to suggest that al Qaeda is not
a threat, or that, unchecked, it is not capable of inflicting upon the
United States and its interests and allies serious damage in human,
psychological, economic, and infrastructural terms. Al Qaeda, in its
essence, is fully committed and persistent in its ideology and objec-
tives. But the United States has sustained worse casualties in other
conflicts than it has from al Qaeda, has faced and defeated more
formidable, better organized, and better equipped foes (even
simultaneously, as in World War II).
The loss of perspective and proportionality is troublesome in at
least two respects. First, elevating al Qaeda to the level of an existen-
tial threat, both emboldens al Qaeda, lending it confidence-and
suggesting to its recruits-that it indeed can topple the United States,
and infuses each decision the United States makes with the type of
fear that obscures judgment and encourages imprudence. An
example is the outcry, after the Abdulmutallab incident, to substan-
tially increase the number of persons on the "no fly" list. That is the
equivalent of seeking to improve the ability to find a needle by
building a vastly bigger haystack. Second, the disproportionate
concentration of resources and attention devoted to al Qaeda-
generated threats, and the corresponding cultivation of fear, at the
expense of all other priorities could very well prevent the United
States from identifying other serious threats-perhaps more substan-
tial than al Qaeda-in time to counteract them effectively and in time.
32. See Lithwick, supra note 22.
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